A fourth insight is that strike costs narrow the range of disagreement between the MTA and TWU Local 100 and make an agreement more likely. If strike costs were zero then TWU Local 100’s best wage demand would be the upper limit of the contract zone and the MTA would be the lower limit of the contract zone. However we know the cost of strike is not zero and it will never be that. Further we know the cost will be imposed on the New York City economy. Thus the strike cost has to be increased in value then that will force the bargainers to compromise more in order to reach a pre strike settlement. The larger the prospective strike costs then the narrower will be the distance separating the TWU Local 100 resistance curve and the MTA concession curve.
Finally is the important role of negotiating tactics in the bargaining process. Both the MTA’s and TWU Local 100 most favorable wage demands are based on what they think the benefits and costs of a particular wage demand are. During the bargaining each side uses a variety of tactics designed to change the opponents’s subjective estimates of these benefits and costs so as to obtain a more favorable settlement.
The big question remains. Do we as a union allow officers who scoff at our Constitution and By-Laws by not paying their dues the last time we fought for a contract simply because they disagreed or disliked the leadership then, do we allow them to negotiate for us now?
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