Proposals III

First proposal - Not acceptable - why should other cleaners from other divisions who have no relation with the Division of Station be lumped as one. It makes no sense. A nurse who works on surgeries in the operating room is not the same as the nurse in the walk in clinic.

Second proposal - Not acceptable - why should the cleaners work out of classification. Those household maintenance belong to other divisions that have no relation to the Station Division.

Third proposal - We will look into it as a possibility in the future however for that to happen we have to replace the current Section 1.6.A Management Rights with the following:

Management Rights

Without limitation upon exercise of any of their statutory powers or responsibilities, the Authorities shall exercise all normally accepted management prerogatives in operating transit facilities safely and efficiently with the advisory input from the employees.

Forth proposal - Maybe however for that to take place we have to replace the current Section 1.5 No Strike Clause with the following:

Strike Clause

During the term of this agreement there shall be a mutually approved strike, sit-down, slow-down, stoppage of work and willful abstinence in whole or in part. The decision of timing of when those above actions will take effect shall be solely that of the TWU Local 100.

Proposal II

First proposal - We will look into it as a possibility in the future however for that to happen we have to replace the current Section 1.6.A Management Rights with the following:

Management Rights

Without limitation upon exercise of any of their statutory powers or responsibilities, the Authorities shall exercise all normally accepted management prerogatives in operating transit facilities safely and efficiently with the advisory input from the employees.

Second proposal - Maybe however for that to take place we have to replace the current Section 1.5 No Strike Clause with the following:

Strike Clause
During the term of this agreement there shall be a mutually approved strike, sit-down, slow-down, stoppage of work and willful abstinence in whole or in part - the decision of timing of when those above actions will take effect shall be solely that of the TWU Local 100.

Third proposal - maybe counter offer eliminate Section 2.6.G

Forth proposal - maybe counter offer eliminate Section 2.6.I

Fifth proposal - maybe counter offer eliminate Section 2.6.K

Sixth proposal - maybe counter offer eliminate Section 2.6.L

Seventh proposal - maybe counter offer eliminate Section 2.6.N

Eight proposal - maybe counter offer eliminate Section 2.6.P

Proposals

There is no question those above proposals are harmful towards TWU Local 100 members and we do not agree with those proposals. It is a charade from our employer to propose terms that will be ‘Net Minus Labor’.  We recall not too long ago when the previous CEO Jay H Walder had the “net zero” labor initiative. We did not agree with that then and we are not going to agree now with the new CEO Joseph Lhota ‘net minus’ labor approach.

“Throughout my career in both the public and private sectors, I have initiated reforms that are performance-based and that cut costs, and I look forward to bringing this same approach to the MTA,” Lhota said in a statement from the governor’s office.

First proposal is unacceptable, why should we as TWU Local 100 pick in advance the ‘holiday picks’ it does not make sense. Who is able to foresee his family needs in advance, then once locked in to that holiday pick what if something pops up such as a family emergency. It is obvious the management has pegged this proposal with the eye in ramping up the disciplinary measures. We here in why did you join the union will call it entrapment however we may consider it in the event that the members of the Transportation Department are awarded five dollars ($5) hourly rate above the train operator title which is a bargain for our employer. Here is why, members of the Transportation Department especially bus operators in their work encompass five (5) titles in the Department of Subway. Bus operators operate the bus that is equivalent to the train operators (660, 651, 909), open and closes doors that is equivalent to the conductor (411, 412, 413), collect fares that is equivalent to the station agent (813, 977), give directions of the best bus routes to get to destination that is equivalent to a telephone operator (868), assist disabled and elderly who can’t take 5 flights of stairs. Based on that ($5) for bus operators above the train operator hourly rate is a good deal for our employer since it is a saving of five titles.

Second proposal ‘Eliminate all caps on runs set forth in Section 5.1E (Runs) 

1. Runs

1) a. Up to thirty percent (30%) of runs may be swing runs and the remainder of the scheduled runs shall be straight runs in the boroughs of Manhattan, the Bronx and Brooklyn.

b. Sixty five percent (65%) of all regular runs (straight runs and swing runs combined) will be completed within a spread of ten (10) hours and all remaining regular runs will be completed within a spread of eleven (11) hours.

2) If a regular swing run is not completed within a spread of eleven (11) hours, time and one-half will be allowed for all time in excess of said eleven (11) hours which may be needed to permit the completion of the run.

3) All spread time in excess of eleven (11) hours will be paid at the rate of time and one half regardless of whether or not the operator has worked eight (8) hours during the period.

The above section is there to protect TWU Local 100 members since our employer is interested in eliminating this section which is indirectly assailing ourselves. In addition why should we relinquish that protection? What in return is the management offering? We may look into it if our employer offers all of the following to the bus operators - first - bus operators shall be entitled to assault pay (‘run pay’) for five (5) years for injuries incurred on duty as a result of physical assaults, second - bus operators shall be entitled to stress premium pay hourly five ($5) dollars for the spread, third - bus operators shall be entitled to challenge for the fare premium of two ($2) dollars for the spread.

Third proposal OA pick practices should be eliminated - we see no point in that, why should OA accept that? It is necessary for bus operators to be present at the pick room - leaving a slip with choices is not good. A slip is an open ticket for manipulation due to the absence of the bus operator.

Forth proposal we do not see the benefit to amend the Preventable Accident Disciplinary Procedures of 2002 MOU due to the fact that the current system is unfavorable towards the bus operators. The arbitrators are trained by our employer and the arbitrators have blindly sided with our employer - there is no point of giving anything more to our employer. As it is the arbitrators have gone further in pleasing and kowtowing our employer. We would recommend a bus operator (who was a steward with TWU Local 100 who has retired within the past five years) who has worked in the borough of Manhattan, the Bronx and Brooklyn as being acceptable as a safety person.

Fifth proposal eliminating - section 5.1(I) Traveling allowance when sent to Foreign depot - we say no, no, no. We would like - first - night differential for holiday to be one ($1) dollar, second - boost time should not effect late slips, third - late slips must initiate reserve time, forth - swing time be paid in full no more half of swing if more than one hour full swing paid on RDO, fifth - headway allowance must be paid for middle of run even when relief is involved, sixth - accidents for each accident pay one (1) hour (accident pay is not affected by boost), seventh - Work Day Off, raise the maximum to six (6) hours from current four (4), eight - snow work phone call to stay ready for snow work four (4) hours pay, ninth - report for snow work sent home eight (8) hours instead of the current six (6) hours, tenth - meal allowance twenty ($20) dollars.

Loss of individualism and flexibility at work

A possible cost of union membership for workers is a loss of individualism and flexibility in doing the job. In a unionized shop personnel policies are generally more rigid allowing workers less discretion in choosing work schedules or job assignments. Workers also have less room for personal initiative in how the job is done. Another consideration is that the lines of communication between workers and management in a unionized firm are not as open or as informal as in nonunion firms, cutting off the access of the worker to the employer. Finally individual union members may feel they have no influence on the decision making process in the union.

Management retribution

A cost of union membership to the worker is possible management retribution. This retribution may take several forms: the employer may fire the worker, reassign him to a less desirable job, or give him a smaller wage increase. These types of antiunion practices by employers are illegal. Employers recognize however that the protection of the law is not ironclad. It is often difficult for the worker to prove that he or she was fired for union activities rather than a legitimate cause such as insubordination or being late to work. Court proceedings are also quite time consuming and expensive and in general the employer has the greater staying power in such matters.

Happy Holidays

Loss of job

A possible cost of union membership is the loss of the job due to layoffs (2010 - over 1,000 TWU Local 100 members were laid off) or the closing of the plant (Stella D’oro in the Bronx closed its cookie plant and sold the plant to real estate developers who will raze the site and build a shopping center - Bakery Workers Union (Local 50 BCTGM) who were shut out of their jobs since August 2008). When a union wins higher wages, greater benefits, or restrictive work rules, the general result is to increase the  employer’s cost of labor per hour. However that is a red herring the executives who over pay themselves award themselves exorbitant bonuses (definitely they keep the share holders happy by providing dividends).

As usual the management claims an increase in labor cost leads to a decline in employment as the firm is forced to move up its labor demand. Another ruse is that should labor costs increase to the point where the revenues of the firm are less than its total variable costs of production, the employer will close the plant and all union members will lose their jobs.

Strike costs

One cost of union membership is the loss of wages during a strike. The threat of strike gives TWU Local 100 its ability  to raise wages and benefits but this extra bargaining power is not without cost, for sometimes the strike must actually be used. The loss in wages during the strike may be offset by strike benefits from the union, although not all unions pay them and those that do, usually pay only about 20 to 30 percent of regular earnings. There is also the possibility that the worker may never get the job back at all if the employer can successfully hire non union workers and break the strike. Finally strikes lead to psychic costs for workers due to the conflict and ill-feelings that a strike engenders between union members and nonstriking workers and management personnel.

Great contract

It is true that all politics are personal for our co workers - the fact is every member of TWU Local 100 wants a great contract, every member wants a wage raise, every member wants great health coverage, every member wants a great pension, every member believes we are the working poor, every member believes our voices must be heard, every member believes TWU Local 100 matters, every member believes in the unfinished struggle.

We are pleased to say the majority of voices we hear continue to support TWU Local 100 and they believe in TWU Local 100. Every member believes in wage and income inequality - every member (99%) believes there can be no good reason why someone should earn fifty or a hundred times as much as the members of TWU Local 100 who clean the stations and trains in which they use. Would they refuse to work if they earned the same as cleaners? How can it be justified that a CEO or a hedge fund manager makes hundreds of millions of dollars per year? For what? Does anyone believe that no one would do these jobs for a lot less?

Every member believes in building up TWU Local 100, that we will win a slightly bigger share of the pie with TWU Local 100 than without it. Every member aspires to a collective bargaining agreement with either no or weak management clauses, without no-strike agreements, with short durations so that when contracts did include a no-strike agreement TWU Local 100 members would not be hamstrung for very long, every member wants friendly grievance procedures. Every member knows that labor-management cooperation wins weaker agreements in each of the above areas. Unions that won better contracts also were usually the most democratic and subject to rank and file control as we in TWU Local 100.

December 15th contract rally

With our contract end 30 days away, TWU Local 100 organized a contract rally outside of MTA headquarters at 2 Broadway, the site of MTA Labor Relations and Managerial offices. The call was put out far and wide to ‘Stand as One’ and ‘fight’ for your contract. Good ideas, but was it the knockout success it needed to be? Was it the kick-start moment our contract fight needs?                 

The answer plainly is no it was not.

First off, the attendance was sparse. From our view about 750 to 1000 members showed up. Which leads to a few questions:

• Are members taking this contract seriously?
• Is TWU Local 100 at fault for not getting the word out?
• Who picked a Thursday for a rally?

Members are either apathetic, uninspired, apprehensive or resigned to the fact that our next contract will be a bad one. How else could anyone explain a modest crowd at a contract showdown meeting? The ‘push’ inside the Union Hall began this past Monday Dec. 12^th. Way too little time to build a mass rally, but some members did get the word. The question must be then: Why didn’t they show up? Some divisions like MOW and TA maintenance were there in large numbers, others like MTA Bus were not. Even some Vice Presidents did not show up: John Day (MTA Bus), Brian Clarke (Mabstoa) must have had pressing prior commitments. Earl Phillips subbed for VP Clarke and a surprisingly animated and vocal Angel Giboyeaux made sure no one missed VP Day.                

The physical area outside 2 Broadway was deceiving as well, members were directed to a narrow lane in the street, at most 10 members could stand across the length of it. A cynical observer would remark that the last two Union events were held in small spaces, (Roseland Ballroom, outside 2 Broadway) to make small crowds look bigger. After all, perception is everything in many ways.

The usual music blared (we hate to nitpick, but who selects the music at these events? It is always the same tired songs over and over) then the speakers came and then some more speakers and even more speakers. Each department had a VP or other representative to speak for it. Then came the politicians, then came the Officials from other Unions, then went home about a quarter of the crowd.

Scheduled was a march to Zuccotti Park to join up with the Occupy Wall Street protesters. But by the time the many speakers wore the crowd down, repeating the same damn thing over and over, only about half those members who came to the rally actually arrived at Zuccotti Park.              

What did they find at Zuccotti Park? About half-a dozen Occupy Wall Street OWS protesters. A slew of Police Officers (we hope making over time OT). The highlight of the night was the ‘mike check’ speech by Amy of OWS. As we found out that night, a ‘mike check’ is when a group is not allowed to have amplified devices, whatever the speaker says is repeated by others in the audience so everyone can hear the content of the original speech. Cute, effective and good reason for people to keep their speeches as short as possible. Too bad the rally outside 2 Broadway did not have a ‘mike check’.

It is fairly easy to anticipate what the other TWU related blogs and websites will say about this rally - ‘The membership is not in support of this administration’, ‘look how few people showed up to the contract rally.’. But that is their usual simplistic, myopic view. Here at why did you join the Union we tend to see the larger issue rather than the politically expedient slant.

The question though remains - does this relatively low turnout at this contract event signal a lack of support for the John Samuelsen administration? If one calculates that 35% to 40% of the membership are not in good standing (eligible to vote for the contract), calculate that 3000 members or so of TWU are not even covered by this contract, the MABSTOA turnout was low for one reason or another. You could also factor in that at least one third of our members are working at any given time and the fact that Thursday is not a good day for a rally. The answer to the question of is the rally’s turnout a sign of little politically, would be that the pool of potential attendees were relatively small.            

In fact, the declared opposition of John Samueslen was on the other side of Broadway across the street from the main rally site and they had less than 10 people with them. So what should that tell you?       

What this rally does tell you is that TWU Local 100 organizing better start living up to its name. On an Organizing level it was bungled. The building of such an event has to have more than a 2 day window. The rally also should not have been so close to the Mass Membership Meeting. Space between meetings is important. If the Date was significant, remember DEC 15^th 2005 TWU went on strike and shut the entire city down for 3 days, then the MMM should have been earlier, maybe in November. TWU Special Events and Organizing has had a bad few months. Whether it is getting a larger crowd out to rallies or running out of food on event days or providing proper spacing between events, the ball has been dropped and now must be put back into play.

State and local government

Perhaps the greatest area of ferment and change with respect to labor law is in state and local government. The introduction of limited collective bargaining rights in the federal sector forced a reevaluation of labor policy in many states and municipalities.

Currently 40 states allow some type of collective bargaining among public employees and about 36 states have fairly comprehensive statutes dealing with public sector employee relations. Among these are 22 states which provide for ‘broad-scale’ bargaining in wages, hours and other conditions of employment which are subject to negotiation. A small number of states require only that agency heads ‘meet and confer’ with union officials - bargaining however is not permitted. Only 11 states allow public employees to strike and those usually specify rather limited circumstances.

The federal sector

One of the most important collective bargaining developments of the last 3 decades has been the rapid spread of unionism among government workers. The initial impetus to unionism in the public sector came from Executive Order 10988 issued by President Kennedy in January 1962. 

The order guaranteed the right of federal employees to join the unions but it prohibited strikes by federal employees. It also prohibited various unfair labor practices by unions and employing agencies much as the Wagner Act did. The executive order permitted collective bargaining between a union and the employing agency on a limited range of issues. Major issues such as hiring, promotion, layoffs, wages and fringe benefits were excluded. A grievance system was also established.

The most recent change in the legal framework of bargaining in the federal sector was the passage of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA). The procedures of the Taft-Hartley Act governing union representation elections and unfair labor practices were incorporated into the CSRA and a new agency the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) was created to administer the law. The CSRA limits the scope of bargaining largely to matter concerning personnel and working conditions. Strikes are still prohibited.

One major group of federal employees, the postal employees are not covered by CSRA. The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 abolished the Post Office Department and established in its place an independent government corporation. The act placed postal employees under the jurisdiction of the Wagner Act, as amended and also allowed bargaining over wages, hours and working conditions. It prohibited strikes however.

Union elections

The Landrum-Griffin Act also sought to insure that elections for union leadership positions were conducted in an open and democratic fashion. Every national union was required to hold elections at least once every 5 years and elections in local unions were to be held at least once every 3 years. The act also required that elections be conducted by secret ballot and that every member have a right to vote.

Trusteeships

In certain situations a national union may take control of the administrative and financial affairs of a local union by placing it in a trusteeship. The McClellan committee found that in some cases a trusteeship was established not to protect union members from incompetent or corrupt officials in the local union but to control the pension and dues money of the local or to stifle political dissent in the union. The Landrum-Griffin Act limited the ability of a national union to place a local under trusteeship and required the national to explain why a trusteeship that lasts more than six (6) months has not been terminated.

Financial disclosure

The Landrum-Griffin Act required that each national and local union file an annual financial disclosure statement listing its assets, liabilities, sources of income, expenditures, salaries and payments to a union official. In addition any loans to business or individuals. The financial disclosure statements are available for inspection by any member of the public.

Bill of Right for Union Members

The Landrum-Griffin Act began with a bill of rights for union members that was intended to ensure the democratic operation of the union and to guarantee the individual member due process in meetings and disciplinary proceedings. Key provisions of the bill of rights were the following:

1. Every union member has an equal right to attend, participate in, and vote at union meetings and elections.
2. Members have freedom to assemble with other members and to voice their opinions concerning the policies of the union and the leadership.
3. Members are protected from arbitrary increase in dues or other assessments.
4. Union members have the right to be informed by union officials of their legal rights under the law.
5. Every member has the right to a reasonable notice of disciplinary action by the union and the right to a fair hearing.

Edwin Thomas (1962 - December 1, 2008)

We here in why did you join the union offer our condolences to the friends and family of Edwin Thomas. Today as members of TWU Local 100 we stand shoulder to shoulder united against assaults, attacks and violence that we have seen on TWU Local 100 members. The victims were innocent hard working members of TWU Local 100 who have had their lives destroyed. Not only have they suffered but their whole families have suffered as well. We are not going to accept the confidence of our safety being undermined. There can be no excuses and no justification. This behavior has disgusted us all in the TWU Local 100 and it cannot be allowed to stand, we will not allow it to stand.

As we are mourning the loss of life of Edwin Thomas our thoughts are with the family and friends. He was truly the face of TWU Local 100 which we are all proud of. 

A 46-year-old New York City bus driver working his route in Brooklyn was stabbed to death on Monday afternoon by a passenger who did not pay the fare, sat down anyway, and later demanded a transfer ticket, the authorities said.

The driver, identified as Edwin Thomas, was operating a bus on the B46 line when he was stabbed at 12:28 p.m. at the intersection of Gates Avenue and Malcolm X Boulevard (also known as Reid Avenue) in Bedford-Stuyvesant, in the 81st Precinct.

Thursday, December 8th 2011 will mark the third anniversary at 4:30 p.m. Join your Union Brothers and Sisters as we hold a candlelight vigil for Bus Operator Edwin Thomas, who died in the line of duty. The gathering is in Brooklyn at the intersection of Gates Avenue and Malcolm X Blvd.

Mass Membership Meeting 2011 - II

TWU Local 100 Mass Membership Meetings, are more obligatory than informative, and they have always been that way. Again, sadly this one was no different. In a contract year, members come to the Mass Membership Meeting to hear about the contract, they want facts and figures - they want exactly what we are asking for from the MTA.  As usual they walked away somewhat empty handed.                

There were no figures, no numbers thrown about. There was however talk about getting a fair and equitable contract, and being financially secure enough to take care of our families. But still, no hard numbers. Some members were visibly disappointed about this lack of information. Others, perhaps those who have been around the block a few times, did not expect any hard numbers. After all, would you go into any negotiation with a publicly broadcast number attached to your notebook?        

The information about our upcoming contract was more ‘thematic’ than ‘dramatic’, more ‘meat and potatoes’ than ‘pie in the sky.’  In many ways the presentation of what the major themes of our upcoming negotiations would be were perhaps a reflection of the man who serves as our President. He is not flashy, dramatic or theatrical. He is however solid, working class and grounded.           

In many ways contract campaigns take the personality of whoever the President of the local is - in the past we have had contract campaigns asking for respect, recognition as professionals etc. The argument could be made that those were reflections of our leadership at the time. This is neither a condemnation nor affirmation, but merely an observation.                

The themes that were revealed to the assembled crowd were solid: Increasing funding streams for mass transit, re-obtaining a no layoff clause, better conditions for all transit workers, ending the second class citizenry of women in transit, an overhaul of the present disciplinary system, better medical coverage, with a special emphasis on our awful dental plan, and of course a wage increase. As usual, a wage increase is always first on our fellow members’ minds.            

Whether any of those themes are attainable is certainly in question. One thing is not in question however, that is how the contract may turn out and who will have a tremendous say in who will be running our local past the next election in 2012. How that assumption will affect the duration and quality of this negotiation period is unknown. It should be rather interesting.

Landrum-Griffin Act

After the Taft-Hartley Act public attention turned to a new issue that was increasingly making headlines due to a lengthy series of Congressional hearings held by the McClellan committee which focused on union corruption and racketeering. Extensive testimony documented alleged cases of kickbacks, pension fraud, intimidation of dissident members by union officials and undemocratic or fraudulent elections for union offices. While the bulk of the testimony focused on a handful of unions most notably the Teamsters union the hearings provided the impetus for general legislation to correct or prevent such abuses. This legislation was the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, commonly referred to as the Landrum-Griffin Act.

The Landrum-Griffin Act was an amendment to the original Wagner Act.

Mass Membership Meeting 2011

The annual TWU Local 100 Mass Membership Meeting (MMM) was held last week at the Roseland ballroom, one half block away from the current Union offices at 1700 Broadway. In many respects it was mostly unremarkable. After you have been involved in the Union for a few years they all seem to run together. To tell you the truth, you could not probably tell the difference from one MMM to another if you had your eyes closed at any of them.  It doesn’t matter who is running the show. It usually breaks down into a few well-worn time tested categories and clichés.                

In contract years it is mainly about how the Union will get a fair and equitable contract and how we need not be afraid of the big bad MTA. This year was no different. In non-contract years, it is mainly about how well we are doing as a Union. The subtitle would be, ‘look what a great President I am.’ Most of the recent non-contract year Mass Membership Meetings have been about such topics, with the possible exception of 2010 in which a new administration replaced a long-standing administration.  

What really separates one MMM from the other are the antics. There are always plenty of antics. It is a veritable circus. Members trying to make themselves noticed or in many cases notable. Not surprisingly there was no shortage of antics at this go ‘round.

The sheer numbers of members who arrive with a snarl on their face is incredible, these people seem to desire attention, first and foremost.  Their public stance is ‘I’m here but I’m not happy’ except when it comes to getting a gift bag from one of the many tables set up at the MMM. Their stony exterior seems to change. As always numerous free gifts were available from TWU special projects and from invited vendors and this MMM was no different. What also never changes is the level of desperation that members show for a few cheap trinkets. Bag trinkets at that. After all how many key chains can one have?                

One of the highlights or lowlights of every Mass Membership Meeting is the obligatory question and answer session which usually follows close to the end of the show. In the Toussaint days, they used to give every member an index card to write a question down for the President. Signaling that everyone would have an equal opportunity to ask a question of the President.

The first time they did it the question they chose was something no one cared about. In fact, everyone thought it was a fix, a set up where they manufactured a softball question not to embarrass the President. The Javits center roared with laughter at the question that was chosen. Rather it roared with laughter that our Union leadership actually thought their members were stupid enough to believe that this was a legitimate question.

The second time the Toussaint administration asked for questions, there was an organized effort by at least half of the members at the meeting to all write the same question down. Surely they figured that if half the people wrote the same question, it would almost be a certainty that it would be heard. This was a Mass Membership Meeting where Toussaint was hooted and booed - seemingly at every turn, they never answered any questions and said they ran out of time before they could get to any questions. By the end of the reign, in his third Mass Membership Meeting, they stopped the charade altogether.                

Last years’ Mass Membership Meeting had a ‘Town Hall’ style event based on the solidarity fund where pro and anti-solidarity fund members basically yelled at each other and critics of Samuelsen got to take their pot-shots in public. That ‘town hall’ style meeting, while ambitious, was essentially futile. No one really listened to each other and each side became more entrenched in opinion. The antics that year came from the former Secretary Treasurer who marched around with his own little entourage.

This years’ Mass Membership Meeting had a question and answer period full of interesting antics as well: a former shop steward in RTO made the accusation that ‘Democracy’ was not being practiced in TWU Local 100. The fact he was able to make that accusation actually proved him wrong if you really think of it. After all you are standing in the yearly MMM making a derogatory comment towards the President on a microphone, it sounds like Union Democracy is working out pretty well.                

The other antics came from a former VP of CED who repeatedly yelled ‘you lied, you lie, you lie’ in reference to the option for a membership vote in regards to a new Union Hall purchase in Brooklyn, his point was that there should be a members vote in regards to the building sale. Members’ votes are good, let there be no mistake on that, but this issue was decided by the TWU Local 100 Executive Board and according to the TWU Constitution, the executive board is the highest decision making body in the Union. The Executive Board are the representatives of the members in most decision making situations. That is the way the constitution and bylaws are written.

Besides this faulty interpretation of the bylaws and constitution, this former VP also was handing what could be described as ‘future’ campaign literature out at the entrance of the Roseland Ballroom, greeting members as they came in. This too is a pretty standard antic at MMMs. This literature was not declaring a run for any office but did highlight the individual in question prominently, and in Local 100 political history is a usual precursor to an electoral bid.

But aside from the non-event antics there were two significant proceedings that were wholly positive and signaled a change for the better in TWU local 100. The first was the appointment of Celeste Kirkland to a Vice Chair position in MOW. Ms. Kirkland is among the one or two women who have risen to the heights of such a position in such a male dominated division. She is truly a trailblazer in her department. The decision to elevate her to that position is a large feather in the cap of this administration.

The second noteworthy event was a motion passed from the floor at the MMM which in and of itself never really happens at these things. Martin Goodman, long-time Union radical made the motion to make one of our demands, the re-hiring of any of the still laid-off members who were laid-off in the 2010-2011 period. The fact that this motion even got on the floor is a radical departure from business as usual in L100. Needless to say, it was passed overwhelmingly.

Decertification elections

An important provision of the Taft-Hartley Act sought to balance the ability of workers to vote for a union with an equal ability to vote out a union. The act established the decertification election in which the workers in a bargaining unit are allowed to vote on whether or not they want to stop being represented by a particular union. If a majority of the votes are in favor of decertification then the union loses its right as a sole bargaining agent for the workers.

Union security

The Taft-Hartley Act concerned the issue of union security which refers to various requirements written into collective bargaining contracts that specify who must join the union and under what conditions. Typical union security requirements have included for example -

1. Closed shops - workers must be a member of the union before they can be hired.
2. Union shops - once hired, a worker must become a union member within 30 days as a condition of continued employment.
3. Agency shops - workers do not have to join a union as a condition of employment but they must pay a monthly fee in lieu of dues for the services that the union provides.

The Taft-Hartley Act made the closed shop illegal and gave individual states the option of prohibiting the union shop through so called right to work laws. Under Section 14(b) of the act, the union shop is legal unless an individual state passes legislation expressly banning it. As of 1987, 21 states mostly in the South and Midwest had done so. Proponents of right to work laws argue that the union shop is a form of compulsory unionism and that no one should be forced to join the union as a condition of employment. Opponents of right to work laws argue that the laws allow nonmembers to get a free ride since by law the union must represent every worker in the bargaining unit even if the worker does not financially support the union. One remedy to the free-rider problem has been the agency shop which is legal in about one-half of the right to work states.

Unfair labor practices

The Wagner Act prohibited a series of unfair labor practices by employers. The 

Taft-Hartley Act added a series of unfair labor practices that unions were prohibited from engaging in. The intent of Congress in passing the Wagner Act was to protect the right of workers to organize. However with the Taft-Hartley Act Congress moved to protect the right of workers not to organize. Unions were prohibited from coercing or discriminating against employees who chose not to be represented by a union. Unions were also placed under the same duty to bargain in good faith just like employers were with the Wagner Act. Unions were also prohibited from engaging in a third unfair labor practice called a secondary boycott. In a secondary boycott a union that has a dispute with one firm (the primary employer) involves neutral, secondary employers in the dispute either by striking them or causing their workers to refuse to handle the goods of the primary firm.

The Taft-Hartley Act

When the Taft-Hartley Act was passed in 1947, collective bargaining in the United States bore little resemblance to the situation that prevailed when the NLRA was enacted in 1935. Union membership in 1935 was 3.5 million concentrated heavily in a few industries such as construction, mining, railroads and needle trades. Thirteen years later union membership stood at 14 million and the mass production industries of autos, steel, rubber and electrical equipment that had once been nearly devoid of unionism were solidly organized.

The success of organized labor set off a reaction among the American public. The public felt that the pendulum had swung too far. Where labor was once the underdog now it was too big and powerful. This sense of unease was heightened by a strike wave that hit the economy in 1946. In comparison presently the economy is not good. However, labor has not fared well with the assault on collective bargaining which is unprecedented by the state governments of Ohio, Wisconsin and New Jersey. Then in 1947 Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act alternatively described by its proponents as a way to restore the balance of power between management and labor and by its critics as a ‘slave labor’ law.

The Taft-Hartley Act did not repeal the Wagner Act, but it did amend the Wagner Act in some important ways. Maybe now is the right time to come with a new act to enhance the labor and collective bargaining.

The National Labor Relations Board

To administer and enforce the Wagner Act a five member National Labor Relations Board NLRB was established. The NLRB is an independent agency of the federal government. Its members serve for 5 year terms and are nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate. The NLRB’s basic responsibility is to investigate and rule on charges of unfair labor practices that are brought before it and to conduct representation elections. Much of the actual casework is handled by staff persons of the NLRB at 51 regional, subregional and resident offices. The law gives the NLRB the power to impose financial penalties and to issue cease and desist orders to end unfair labor practices. The caseload of the board grew tremendously between 1970 and 1980 as the annual number of unfair labor practice charges filed more than doubled. Since we are faced with an economy that is on a downward spiral maybe the NLRB will have a tremendous caseload now. However the caseload has declined since then with the sharp drop in union membership and organizing activity.

NLRB’s narrow constructed mandate should be expanded to include religious workplace issues that are on the rise when employers do not have a good valid job related reason for religious discrimination. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission EEOC has lagged, one wonders why.

Unfair labor practices

In order to protect the right of workers to join and participate in unions the Wagner Act prohibited certain unfair labor practices by the employer. An employer would commit an unfair labor practice should he or she attempt to interfere with, coerce, dominate or discriminate against employees in the exercise of their right to organize and bargain. Examples of unfair labor practices are threatening discharge, demotion or loss of job if an employee persists in union activity - interrogating prospective or present employees about their union sympathies or affiliations and discriminating against an employee because of the filing of a grievance or unfair labor practice charge. A firm also commits an unfair labor practice if it refuses to bargain in ‘good faith’ with the union in an attempt to reach a collective bargaining agreement - sound familiar?

A very fine line often separates what is and what is not an unfair labor practice by the employer. The law does not require that an employer remain neutral in a union-organizing campaign. It is legal for an employer to explain and defend its labor policies and to present the advantages and disadvantages of unions in speeches and written communications to its workers as long as it does not threaten reprisals or loss of benefits. Thus an employer may legally publicize the fact that it is operating at a loss - you have heard this one from MTA  and that other unionized companies in its industry have recently gone out of business. It cannot state that if it is unionized it will close its doors and the workers will lose their jobs.

Collective bargaining II

Before the Wagner Act the law did not forbid collective bargaining but the employer was under no legal compulsion to accept it. Without legal or administrative means with which to secure recognition and bargaining rights, unions had to strike to force the employer to accede to bargaining. Because the issue of union recognition and collective bargaining was often seen by both labor and management as a matter of principle and not subject to compromise there occurred a number of bitter and drawn out ‘recognition’ strikes throughout the late 1800s and the beginning decades of the twentieth century that resulted in considerable violence and a general radicalization of emotions on the issue of unionism.

Three key provisions of the Wagner Act fundamentally altered the practice of collective bargaining and the balance of power between workers and employers. The first was the prohibition of various antiunion unfair labor practices by employers, the second was the establishment of the union representation election, and the third was the establishment of the quasi judicial National Labor Relations Board to administer and enforce the law. The act covered all workers except those with supervisory or managerial roles or persons employed in the government (local, state and federal), agriculture, domestic service and industries (railroads and airlines) that were covered under the Railway Labor Act.

Collective bargaining

The organizational structure of TWU Local 100 is one important determinant of its effectiveness in pursuing five functions of organizing, negotiation, striking, contract administration and political action. A second important determinant is the legal framework that governs collective bargaining. This framework is composed of statute law, common law, court rulings and rulings of regulatory agencies that together define the rules of the game by which both MTA and TWU Local 100 have to play. These rules are of paramount importance in collective bargaining because they define the rights and responsibilities of both sides and the amount of power that each brings to the bargaining table.

Without a doubt the single most important piece of legislation with respect to collective bargaining is the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) also known as the Wagner Act. Prior to its enactment in 1935 public policy towards unionism and collective bargaining had been generally repressive and obstructive. The Wagner Act represented a fundamental shift in public policy because for the first time the power of the federal government was explicitly committed to the protection of the right to organize and the promotion of the process of collective bargaining.

The importance of the Wagner Act can be better judged by comparing it with the legal environment that existed prior to its adoption. The Wagner act did not legalize either union or the process of collective bargaining which have been established in the nineteenth century by various court decisions. The Wagner Act protected the worker from discrimination or harassment for the exercise of that right. Prior to its passage employers were free to fire, demote, or refuse to hire union members or persons suspected of union sympathies. To prevent unionism, employers frequently hired agents and spies to infiltrate a union organization to disrupt its activities and discover its leaders. Once discovered the union activists faced the risk of being fired and ‘blacklisted’ among the other employers in the area making it impossible for these workers to find employment.

Bargainers learning function III

Not all labor negotiations exhibit the pattern of mutual concession and convergence to a settlement. Currently MTA will be doing the bidding of the New York State Governor Andrew Cuomo, since he has set a precedent that other labor organizations must follow in tow. We do not agree with Civil Service Employees Association CSEA President Danny Donohue - with friends like him we do not need enemies - who agreed to a five year agreement that had no wage raise for the first three years. In addition that agreement was laced with givebacks and endless concessions.

However we in the TWU Local 100 are opposed to the 21st century Boulwarism - we are not going to accept MTA firm and final offer that we have either to accept or reject. MTA offer can be billed in any manner they prefer, and they can claim it as a fair and equitable settlement. However, General Electric learned in 1969 that Boulwarism did not work.

If Boulwarism worked with CSEA it will not work with TWU Local 100 - we are definitely not going to follow the Donohue principle of givebacks and endless concessions.

Bargainers learning function II

Aspiration level theory provides several important insights into both the resistance and concession curves and the actual practice of collective bargaining. The first has to do with the process of concession as well as the convergence of the reaction functions. We pointed earlier that often TWU Local 100 and MTA enter the negotiations with overly optimistic expectations of what they will be able to win - TWU Local 100 (or at least hopes) that the MTA will concede faster than it actually does while the MTA hopes for moderate or ‘responsible (net-zero wage increases)’ demands from TWU Local 100. The result in this case is that neither side gives in as much as the other expects and as the aspiration theory predicts the two sides mutually lower their estimates of what is attainable resulting in concessions and a movement along the resistance and concession curves toward the point of agreement.

A second insight provided by the aspiration level theory concerns the best use of bluffing in labor negotiations (does not happen in diplomacy or finance). Now lets look at the usual purpose of bluffing which is to give the negotiator some room to make concessions or to shift the opponents estimates in a way favorable to the bargainer.

Bluffing can also work to a bargainers disadvantage however since at some point the bluff (if it is truly a bluff) will have to be given away as a concession and the larger the concession is the more the other side is motivated to toughen its demands.

Aspiration level theory also explains the incremental way TWU Local 100 negotiators move toward a settlement. One might imagine an exasperated MTA negotiator saying to his or her TWU Local 100 counterpart ‘Let’s quit kidding around. You and I both know were going to settle for a raise of 25¢ so lets get it over with. That’s my offer!’ Unfortunately for the MTA negotiator ‘coming clean’ like that usually does not result in a settlement but in an escalation of TWU Local 100 demand. The MTA immediate offer of 25¢ (even though there is a huge gap to $1.50 which the membership desires) wont cease until the TWU Local 100 negotiator acquiesces. This example points out what is perhaps one of the most difficult tasks facing a TWU Local 100 negotiator - how to make concessions without the other side reading it as a sign of weakness.

Bargainers learning function I

To predict the actual time path of wage demands it is necessary to specify in the mathematical representation of the reaction functions the exact of the bargainers uses in modifying their position. This decision rule is the bargainer’s learning function. The learning function of each bargainer states how its wage demand will change given a particular change in the opponent’s demand. The learning function captures the crucial process of strategic interaction in the bargaining.

Can we develop a mathematical equation for this learning phase? Maybe, however it is not easy to develop one due to the nature of the back and forth between the bargainers. Principally because the analysis becomes too complicated. The basic idea that underlies the learning function can be easily explained however to capture the dynamic interaction between TWU Local 100 and MTA bargainers one approach can be based on the learning function on what is called aspiration level theory. According to this theory people have goals or aspirations that they seek to obtain. Studies in psychology have shown that a person’s aspirations behave in a predictable way rising with greater than expected success and failing with less than expected success. In calculating the most favorable wage demands both TWU Local 100 and MTA negotiators implicitly estimate what the other side’s demand will be and how fast the opponent will concede during the negotiations. Lets assume for example that TWU Local 100 negotiator based on his or her subjective estimate of the MTA negotiator’s initial offer will be zero (0) an hour and that this offer will then be increased to 15¢ in the second round. What happens to TWU Local 100 wage demand if the MTA offers only 15¢ an hour?

The failure of the MTA wage offer to meet TWU Local 100 negotiators expectations should cause a reevaluation of TWU Local 100 demand. TWU Local 100 negotiator might conclude that he or she had overestimated the MTA vulnerability to strike costs or underestimated that the MTA bargainer had attached to the stated objective of holding down labor costs. If TWU Local 100 becomes convinced that the MTA position is not a bluff but is in fact the MTA firm actual bargaining position then the aspirations level theory predicts that the TWU Local 100 negotiator would respond by lowering the TWU Local 100 demand from its initial position. Had the MTA initial wage offer been more than TWU Local 100 anticipated the opposite result would be predicted TWU Local 100 bargainer would raise his or her expectations of what was attainable and would concede less than originally planned.

Contract Demand Meeting

The contract demand meeting at the Sheraton hotel was a success. The turnout was great. John E. Samuelsen president of TWU Local 100 speech was a traditional one. In addition what was said was what the management should hear. What was said from the management side was in a conciliatory tone which was a great move from the new MTA chairman Joseph Lhota. 

Raise of wage

To increase the MTA estimate of the strike costs that New York City will bear we demand that John E Samuelsen president of TWU Local 100 adopt a belligerent attitude in the bargaining process. We also recommend that he should take a strike vote among the membership. If in the event that he speaks to the press we prefer the following statement, ‘if we don’t get our demands, there’ll be a strike!’.

He should tell the MTA that the subjective estimates of the costs that TWU Local 100 would incur from a strike would be minuscule. Specifically by publicizing how large our strike fund or the amount of savings the membership has built up. We are aware that they may try to manipulate our estimate, however we know we are due for a raise.

The MTA negotiator for example may bring to the table a mass of charts and diagrams to show TWU Local 100 how precarious the MTA financial position is or why TWU Local 100’s large demands will result in layoffs. Part of this is a useful exchange of information so that TWU Local 100 knows the MTA’s true position many times. However it also has large elements of bluffing as the MTA deliberately exaggerates the negative consequences of a particular wage increase in order to win a less expensive settlement. TWU Local 100 must play the same game by trying to persuade management that a wage increase will cost less than it thinks because of better worker morale and increased productivity.

The bargainers’ objective functions IV

A fourth insight is that strike costs narrow the range of disagreement  between the MTA and TWU Local 100 and make an agreement more likely. If strike costs were zero then TWU Local 100’s best wage demand would be the upper limit of the contract zone and the MTA would be the lower limit of the contract zone. However we know the cost of strike is not zero and it will never be that. Further we know the cost will be imposed on the New York City economy. Thus the strike cost has to be increased in value then that will force the bargainers to compromise more in order to reach a pre strike settlement. The larger the prospective strike costs then the narrower will be the distance separating the TWU Local 100 resistance curve and the MTA concession curve.

Finally is the important role of negotiating tactics in the bargaining process. Both the MTA’s and TWU Local 100 most favorable wage demands are based on what they think the benefits and costs of a particular wage demand are. During the bargaining each side uses a variety of tactics designed to change the opponents’s subjective estimates of these benefits and costs so as to obtain a more favorable settlement. 

The bargainers’ objective functions III

A second important feature of the bargaining process helps to explain the gradual convergence that takes place between the TWU Local 100 resistance curve and the MTA’s concession curve. At each round of negotiations the bargainers have to reestimate their objective functions and their best wage demands. It is likely that if a strike is utilized as a bluffing technique then as the deadline approaches the bargainers’ estimate of both the probability of a strike and the amount of strike costs will increase as they face the reality of a shutdown. The wage demands of TWU Local 100 and the MTA will also converge as the strike deadline forces them to concede bargaining of secondary importance in order to resolve the issues that are major stumbling blocks towards an agreement. As the bargaining process continues therefore both the TWU Local 100 and MTA are forced to reevaluate their most favorable bargaining demands as their subjective estimates of the benefits and costs change over the negotiations. Each point on the resistance and concession curves is thus the best wage demand that comes out of this dynamic to make the best of each bargainer’s objective function.

A third insight concerns the fundamental importance of the right to strike in collective bargaining. As many of you are aware the Taylor law has denied us the right to strike - that is the yardstick of a strike in its ability to impose costs on the New York City economy which the mayor of New York City has to answer for. However that indirect cost does not pass on to the MTA. Therefore based on that the MTA is severely restricted and the MTA has little incentive to bargain with TWU Local 100 or compromise to reach an agreement. In addition to those executives in the MTA that do not reside in New York City or utilize public transportation they are out of touch with the average New Yorker’s desires for premier mass transportation. They do not answer directly to the mayor of New York City based on the above. Without the threat of a strike or some other cost imposing sanctions on New York City economy the MTA best wage offer in this case is the lower limit of the contract zone.

The bargainers’ objective functions II

To maximize utility TWU Local 100 negotiators should raise the wage demand as long as the marginal increase is an expected utility from the higher wage and exceeds the marginal decrease in expected utility from strike costs. The best wage demand is $1.50 per hour for TWU Local 100 as an initial demand and would determine the starting point for its concessions curve such to land at 99¢.

The MTA bargainers have made the same sort of calculations. The desire to win as low a wage increase as possible must be balanced against probable strike costs necessary to obtain it. Starting from the upper limit of the contract zone the MTA negotiator would compare the additional benefit from a lower wage against the additional strike costs that would be likely to go with it. As the negotiator considers lower and lower wage offers at some point - say when the wage increase falls below that granted by a private sector - the additional utility from yet a lower wage begins to diminish while expected strike costs become quite large. By equating marginal benefit and marginal cost the MTA bargainer would arrive at a most favorable wage demand as the starting point for the MTA’s resistance curve.

Clearly there are important points about the bargaining process. First at the beginning of bargaining a relatively wide distance separates the wage demands of the two sides. There are several factors that account for this - one is that the threat of a strike still lays in the distance and psychologically the bargainers tend to discount the amount of strike costs they would incur. Therefore this reduces the value in each bargainer’s functions leading the TWU Local 100 to demand a relatively high wage and the MTA to offer a relatively low wage. Second at the beginning of the negotiations one or both sides may have an over confidence of expectations about how much the other side will give into without a strike leading to inflated estimates of the variables in each bargainer’s too large demands. This tendency of inflated demands at the beginning of bargaining reflects in part the knowledge of skilled negotiators that it is easier to come down in one’s demands if they are too high than it is to increase one’s demands from too low an initial position. A third reason for the wide distance separating the reaction functions is that at the beginning of bargaining both sides typically engage in demand exaggeration or bluffing. Bluffing is part of the bargaining tactic used by labor negotiations in which one side attempts to alter the other party’s subjective estimates of the benefits and costs of a particular wage in a way that yields a more favorable settlement.

The bargainers’ objective functions I

To be able to predict the outcome of the bargaining process it is necessary to first specify the goals of the bargainers. One common assumption is that the bargainers desire to obtain the wage rate that maximizes their subjective expected utility. This term emphasizes that the utility to be gained from any given wage demand can never be known with certainty by either TWU Local 100 or the MTA prior to bargaining but must be predicted on the basis of subjective estimates of the benefits and costs that go with it. 

The starting points of the reaction functions show the initial wage demand of TWU Local 100 and the initial wage offer of the MTA. However one has to consider how the negotiators arrived at these particular wage demands? There are many answers one can chose from. Each bargainer demands in the negotiations that the wage maximizes its subjective expected utility. To determine this wage each bargainer must compare the expected benefits with the expected costs for each wage rate in the contract zone. This calculation for the TWU Local 100 bargainer has hypothetical values for the four variables.

The higher the TWU Local 100 wage demand the lower the probability that the MTA will accept it without a strike. TWU Local 100 bargainers utility increases slowly for a wage of 90¢ or less more rapidly by up to $1.20 and at a diminishing rate of up to $1.50 as the presumed upper limit of the contract zone. The rationale for this pattern might be the following. TWU Local 100 negotiators may feel that they have to get at least 90¢ in order to keep the membership’s wage up with the rate of inflation or the industry pattern since a wage increase below that would provide relatively little increase in utility. Utility increases at a faster pace for wage increase between 90¢ and $1.20 as the bargainers demonstrate their ability to win more from the MTA. Beyond a $1.20 increase, utility grows at a diminishing rate as TWU Local 100 bargainer’s success leads to a growing concern over negative employment effects and the threat of layoff from the MTA. However with a low wage offer the probability of striking increases. If the wage demand from TWU Local 100 is a low wage demand then that will send a message that the negative utility from the costs are also low while the TWU Local 100 wage demands escalates. However so does the duration of a strike necessary to obtain it therefore causing strike costs to rise at an increasingly rapid rate.  

The contract zone

Explicit or implicit in nearly every bargaining the concept is of a contract zone. The contract zone defines the range of wage rates within which a settlement is possible. The upper limit of the contract zone is determined by the maximum wage rate that TWU Local 100 would desire to obtain - the lower limit of the contract zone is determined by the minimum wage rate that the MTA would desire to have. Between the upper limit of TWU Local 100 and the lower limit of the MTA is where the bargaining wages will take place and where a settlement will be reached.

The next task of bargaining models is to predict the actual wage rate in the contract zone to which TWU Local 100 and the MTA agree at the end of the negotiations. Unfortunately the nature of the bargaining process is such that it is not easy to construct an estimate that is realistic. The reason is because of the strategic interaction that takes place between the bargainers. Strategic interaction arises from the dependency between the wage demands of TWU Local 100 and the MTA, the size of the MTA’s wage offer that for example influences TWU Local 100 demand which then causes the MTA to modify its offer which causes a further change in the TWU Local 100 position and so on.

Bargaining power

Power is the essence of collective bargaining. The ability of the TWU Local 100 to obtain what it wants and the ability of the MTA to resist TWU Local 100 demands depends on the relative power position of each side. It is fundamental to understand the process of wage determination in collective bargaining power and the source of power available to the TWU Local 100 and the MTA.

Bargaining power may be defined as one’s ability to induce an opponent to agree on one’s own terms. The origin of bargaining power is twofold. One determinant of bargaining power is the ability of TWU Local 100 to impose costs on the MTA if the MTA does not agree to TWU Local 100’s terms. The second determinant of TWU Local 100 bargaining power is the ability to insulate itself from retaliatory cost-imposing sanctions by MTA. This description of bargaining power suggests that one side’s ability to win its demands depends on how costly it can make disagreement for the other while minimizing its own costs. Much of collective bargaining involves jockeying back and forth between TWU Local 100 and MTA as each seeks ways either to strengthen its own sanctions against the other side or to protect itself from the cost-imposing ability of its opponent.

The single most important source of bargaining power for TWU Local 100 is the threat of a strike while for the MTA it is the ability to resist a strike. A Strike imposes costs on both sides since the MTA management loses its credibility, confidence of New Yorkers as a state agency while we in the TWU lose earnings from work. The relative bargaining power of the MTA in relation to TWU Local 100 hinges on whether the costs of a strike fall more heavily on the MTA management or the TWU Local 100 members.

Questions - 1. How does bargaining power effect the size of the wage increase that TWU Local 100 is able to win from the MTA? What factors increase the TWU Local bargaining power? What factors increase the MTA? 2. What factors influence the size of the TWU Local 100 and MTA initial wage demands in bargaining? How might a skilled negotiator be able to change the other side’s demands to be more in his or her own favor?